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avid Adams Richards has long been misrepresented as a 
grim and didactic moralist. In 1987, in her groundbreaking 
study of Maritime fiction, Under Eastern Eyes, Janice Kulyk 
Keefer made a judgment that has stuck, describing his fictional world 
as one that presents “an intolerably dreary, foreclosed reality” (170). 
Commenting on the contrived use of coincidence in Bay of Love and 
Sorrows, David Creelman concludes in Setting in the East: Maritime 
Realist Fiction (2003) that “appropriate amounts of joy and suffering 
are doled out to the redeemed and the damned respectively” (170). 
Creelman finds that in several novels, Richards’s “emphatic tone has 
limited the text[s’] ability to engage and compel his audience” (171). 
This interpretation of Richards’s fiction as repellently and reductively 
one-dimensional in its themes prevails, again, in reviews of his novel 
Mercy among the Children, which was a co-winner of the Giller Prize in 
2000. Sandy Fernandez claims that the protagonist, Sydney Henderson, 
and the narrator, Lyle Henderson, are embodiments respectively of New 
Testament mercy and Old Testament wrath, and that didacticism limits 
the complexity of the narrative: “The underlying allegories are clear, 
but the story is only half sketched in” (63). Aida Edemariam states that 
an emphasis on ethically powerful and unambiguous themes makes 
the characters one-dimensional: “The extent to which his characters 
represent absolutes, however, undercuts his ambitious book” (20). In 
a review-interview, Ray Robertson adheres to the consensus that has 
prevailed among Canadian critics since the appearance of Richards’s 
first novel, The Coming of Winter, in 1974, finding that Richards’s fic-
tion tends to convey obvious moral messages and to construct exces-
sively tidy plots: Mercy among the Children, he claims, “lays out another 
tightly wound tale of moral choice and the perils of conviction and 
non-conviction” (14). 
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If there has been what Tony Tremblay, one of Richards’s most cogent 
apologists, calls “the worst kind of colonialist, satisfied dismissal” of 
his works because of their regionalism (84), it has been exacerbated 
by the polemical stance taken by the author. In a 2005 interview with 
Tremblay, Richards undertakes a direct attack on critical misconcep-
tions of his work. He notes that regionalists who write with intelli-
gence are bound to be scorned, implying that when critics recognize 
his regionalism, they also underestimate his intelligence (28). As for 
the anti-Catholic epithet, he points out that he is always for the faith 
but against the Church, for the saints but against the bureaucrats (28). 
He attacks those who have given insufficient or wrongheaded attention 
to his works, calling many professors of literature and literary critics 
“intellectual illiterates” who have no idea how to interpret what they are 
reading (38). Richards defends what Tremblay calls the “anti-academic 
thread” that has appeared in his work, commencing with Hope in the 
Desperate Hour, in which Professor Christopher Wheem is condemned 
for his lack of compassion; Richards argues that the cloistered and 
judgmental academic community needs to be scrutinized (40). This 
portrayal and others to come later, such as that of the condescending 
and careerist Professor David Scone in Mercy, express what academics 
Herb Wyile and Christopher Armstrong describe as Richards’s criticism 
of the “reform identities of feminism and middle-class progressivism” 
(113). The interventions of liberal middle-class professionals to help the 
poor or marginalized come in for attack again in Mercy, in the satirical 
treatment of interfering and prejudicial social worker Diedre Whyne.
The deleterious result of this literary feud between Richards, his 
attackers, and his defenders, is that the intentional fallacy has proven 
to be alive and well in criticism of Richards’s texts. Critics tend to 
think of the sensibility of the author lurking behind the texts rather 
than beginning with a close reading of each novel. Richards’s literary 
reputation as a single-minded essentialist or his personal reputation as 
the Miramichi scrapper distracts critics from a diligent and responsible 
consideration of his texts. This distraction has led to the proliferation of 
false dichotomies. On the anti-Richards side, Richards has been labelled 
an absolutist, a universalist, a naturalist, or an anti-progressive thinker 
and therefore, according to Armstrong and Wyile, someone who “is in 
danger of being lumped with the neo-conservatives” (15). In response, 
the defenders of Richards have often opted for counter-labels. Rather 
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than a narrow regionalist, Richards has been regaled as one of the neg-
lected voices of authentic Canadian society (Tremblay 79), embodying 
the needed alternative to a doctrinaire urbanism or Toronto-centrism or 
internationalism. According to Stephen Henighan, international content 
was such an imperative in Canadian literature during the 1990s that 
the catchphrase about Canadian literary texts used by our critics and 
publishers was “They can’t be about things here” (180). In countering 
the charge that Richards is a reductive moralist (and thus a simplistic 
thinker), some pro-Richards critics have emphasized his honest investi-
gations of human subjectivity and emotion: Margo Wheaton argues that 
he stands in awe of the mystery of the human personality (57); William 
Connor that he celebrates the greatness of humans in the form of their 
potential for selfless heroic sacrifice (63). These counter-emphases to the 
moralist label suggest that Richards values universal moral and spiritual 
truths or the timeless truths of the heart rather than complex intel-
lectual insights about how those truths are enacted by individuals in 
social and historical circumstances; nothing could be further from the 
truth. Sometimes a single critic offers up a dichotomy: David Creelman 
argues that Richards has moved from being a bleak naturalist whose 
heroes have no freedom outside society to being a writer of romances, 
whose protagonists achieve some free sense of self by tapping “some 
transcendental or mythic power” (162). If critics cannot place Richards 
on one side, then they must put him on the other: if his satire is “largely 
reserved for the middle-class” (Wyile 112), then his comedy is “the 
comedy of the underdog” (Wyile 109). 
This is not to deny that Richards’s independent intellectual stance 
has long included an objection to the narrow interpretation of life and 
art along the lines of middle-class ideologies. In this regard, it is rel-
evant to note Richards’s argument in his 1987 essay “Lockhartville and 
Kevin O’Brien,” included in his 1994 collection, A Lad from Brantford 
and other essays. Here, Richards finds that the play based on the auto-
biographical novel Various Persons Named Kevin O’Brien, by his mentor 
Alden Nowlan, reduces the novel from a “subtle and encompassing” 
(40) portrait of a young man searching for his identity while growing 
up in poverty in Nova Scotia in the nineteen-thirties and forties to a 
contemporized feminist complaint against patriarchy. Nowlan’s father, 
Judd, is portrayed with one-dimensional dogmatism, Richards argues, 
whereas the novel shows that the young Nowlan appreciates his father’s 
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tenderness, and Judd Nowlan’s involvement in the First World War 
is trivialized rather than honoured, as it is in the novel (41). Richards 
argues that the play turns a complex young man of the thirties into a 
“quasi-feminist of the 1980’s” (41), a multi-dimensional novel into an 
advertisement for a current ideology: “In the play, art has become social 
work. Nothing more than a holding forth on a morally superior lifestyle. 
Much of it contrary to the novel’s genius” (42). We need look no further 
for Richards’s direct implication that his art, like that of his mentor, is 
of the more “subtle and encompassing” variety.
Fortunately, in turning to an in-depth reading of Mercy, Richards 
shows us the way with this and other overlooked but leading comments, 
and the same may be said for some critical insights rendered by care-
ful academic readers. Balancing the emphasis on a subjective view of 
human emotion in his novels, Richards points out that there is also a 
controlling intelligence, guided by “an analytical survey of humanity, 
which I prefer and have become very comfortable with” (Tremblay 36). 
This controlling intelligence has been labelled moralistic, didactic, and 
reductive; however, Richards draws attention to the irony in his own 
work (Tremblay 39). Tony Tremblay also draws attention to Richards’s 
irony when he finds that his work is characterized by a “subtlety of 
intentions” (89) and by “the allowance for uncertainty that Richards 
gives his characters” (90). Margo Wheaton emphasizes this irony when 
she insists that his characters are “relentlessly complex” (54) and that 
his novels portray “human beings in all their immense, contradictory 
shades of light and darkness” (55). Sheldon Currie argues that the reader 
must bring to Richards’s works “a healthy tolerance for ambiguity” and 
“the kind of intelligence and imagination necessary to discover meaning 
without the author’s intervention” (67). Currie goes on to state that the 
reader needs “the wit and sense of humour necessary to see the comic 
in the tragic and vice versa,” for these Miramichi narratives are “simul-
taneously tragic and comic” (68). Currie acknowledges furthermore 
that Richards’s novels are indeed “subtle and embracing,” that humour 
is important to Richards’s vision, and that his humour is ironical rather 
than doctrinaire or one-dimensionally ideological. The subject of his 
humour, like that of all of his work, is the moral, spiritual, emotional, 
and intellectual struggles of humanity and therefore its beauty, as Inge 
Sterrer-Hauzenberger notes (68). 
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This article conducts a thorough, but by no means exhaustive, 
reading of Mercy, in order to articulate some of its complexities and 
indeterminacies; it does not read the novel “against the grain.” The 
central tenet of the critical approach here is that the novel is suffused or 
saturated with irony, which is seen in the multi-levelled insights of its 
astringent humour; its self-reflexive use of key thematic concepts that 
entail controversies of meaning; the multi-dimensional characteriza-
tions, which complicate the assignation of allegorical concepts with 
considerations of social and psychological realism; and the mediating 
narrative frame, which views the narrative’s central meanings through 
an interpretive lens that invites critical scrutiny. The upshot of these 
multiple ironies is that the tone becomes multi-faceted, character is 
destabilized, the assignation of the one-to-one equivalencies of tradi-
tional allegory is dislodged and becomes no longer adequate to describe 
the text at hand, and we must recognize that Richards is practising a 
much different kind of allegory — the kind that conducts an ongoing 
and finally unresolved debate about the narrative’s meanings while in 
the process of constructing them. 
The humour in Mercy is caustic, all-pervasive, and directed not 
against any particular group but against sin, folly, and self-deceit; in 
the novel, acerbic wit combines with compassionate understanding 
to inspire meditations on the tragicomic nature of life. As Tremblay 
affirms, Richards’s seldom-recognized humour is closely related to his 
humanity (12). This derisive satire is apparent in the sudden and com-
plete self-deceptions of Connie Devlin. For example, Connie, Sydney 
Henderson’s low-life nemesis, is “astonished at his own goodness” in 
saying nothing about Sydney being “that way” and molesting young 
Trenton Pit (26). The satirical point here is multi-layered. First, Connie 
Devlin, that devilishly self-serving con man, indulges in “his old endur-
ing weakness” of going along unthinkingly with what others say for his 
own advantage. In order to endear himself to Mat Pit, the young thug 
who rules the Stumps road with brutal power and to whom Connie 
plays brainless and generally overlooked sidekick, he allows Mat to foster 
this vicious lie about Sydney. Second, in deciding to say nothing him-
self, Connie manages deftly both to take the path of least effort and to 
stroke his ego with a false compliment about his own nobility: here we 
have the lazy and laconic con man conning himself. Third, whatever 
thought he does muster is guided by a laughable lack of integrity and by 
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utter cowardice. Fourth, the ethically and intellectually puny Connie 
is Sydney’s opposite, for Sydney is the prodigiously self-schooled, prin-
cipled, and courageously independent thinker who suffers much for his 
greatness of character. This use of Connie as a foil for Sydney develops 
further ironic depth when we discover that protagonist and antagonist 
were both molested by the same priest, Father Porier (310), and that this 
early trauma has propelled their lives in dramatically different direc-
tions.
The comedy intensifies as the novel’s narrative speeds toward its con-
clusion in a tragicomic series of events that take place in a Friday bliz-
zard on the Stumps road, and we realize that the blindness caused by the 
blizzard is a moral one: Drowne notes that this “moralized landscape” 
is especially common in allegory (210). In one strand of the narrative, 
Lyle, Sydney’s son, goes to the home of Connie Devlin, planning to kill 
him because he suspects Connie of robbing and killing his father. With 
comic bathos, Connie is found hanging like a coat in his own closet, 
squirming and squeaking in the process of hanging himself. Unable to 
commit the murder he had intended, Lyle cuts him down (383). The 
reader expects some gravity or perhaps a sincere confession from Connie 
at this moment, but his first words are a comic deflation of expectation: 
“Tea would be nice,” he suggests. Calmly, he insists that it be properly 
steeped and served with a baby biscuit; he then proceeds to tell the 
story of how he caused Sydney’s death, beginning with the detail that 
he first robbed him of twenty-five thousand dollars because he “was 
tempted” (384). Again, this tale within Lyle’s first-person narrative is 
set in thick snow, symbolic of moral blindness (386). On his way back 
from a three-year exile in a northern work camp to earn money for his 
destitute family, Sydney has carried the tiny Connie, made a fire for 
him, been robbed while fetching firewood, and tried to rescue Connie 
from a ledge where he had fallen after hopping around because his 
shoe caught on fire (386). Unable to move because he has ruptured his 
own appendix while carrying Connie, Sydney gives Connie his boots 
and socks. Connie promises to send help and to rescue Sydney’s poems 
but takes the money, leaves the poems, and says nothing about Sydney 
when he finds help. Sydney dies helping Connie, who closes his story by 
admitting to Lyle that he’s “never been able to do those things like help 
people” (387). Thus are the great brought down by the small not with 
a bang but a self-indulgent whimper, says the text’s tragicomic humour. 
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Comedy is also prominent in the second series of climactic events 
that unwind during that Friday blizzard, this narrative strand involv-
ing the petty criminal doings of the Pit siblings, Mat and Cynthia. Mat 
grabs his sister Cynthia, Leo McVicer’s lover; throws her into Leo’s 
Cadillac; heads down the Stumps road in the blizzard; and runs over 
the six-year-old Percy Henderson, who has come out to the highway to 
look for his older brother Lyle, who was supposed to be taking care of 
him (400). Mat drives on, beating Cynthia as he does (for her many 
betrayals of him); then, knowing that her brother plans to kill her, she 
jumps out in the centre of the city in front of the civic centre. With 
marvellous comic incongruity, the emotionally and physically bruised 
Cynthia wanders dazed into a child visionary’s rally, and is saved. It is 
the one indisputable moment of purely Augustinian redemption in the 
novel: regardless of merit, and without her even being aware that she 
has a soul, the sinner is unexpectedly saved. 
The series of events leading to Cynthia’s salvation, with its blend 
of comic absurdity, violence, and Catholic doctrine, is similar to the 
work of Flannery O’Connor, the highly ironic and comic regionalist 
with whom Richards is never compared. Yet they should be compared, 
for Richards and O’Connor both use the shock tactics of brutality 
and acerbic wit to confront the reader with moral and spiritual truths. 
O’Connor’s story “Parker’s Back” depicts a similar sinner who turns 
his back on God and religion. Parker is an indolent, self-centred, and 
cynical drinker and brawler who nonetheless is mysteriously (though 
he finds her ugly and repellent) compelled to marry a “saved” woman 
who castigates him for the vanity of his tattoos, the one touchstone for 
intimations of immanence in his life (and, on an emotional level, the 
one relief from his periods of gloom). This wayward everyman experi-
ences his moment of salvation while hurtling through the air in the 
middle of a tractor accident, “yelling in an unbelievably loud voice, 
‘GOD ABOVE!’” (665). 
Through its use of humour, Richards’s text can mean more things 
simultaneously and with heightened seriousness. The same can be said 
for its recognition of the layers of meaning attaching to key spiritual 
terms, such as grace. The ironies surrounding Cynthia’s salvation show 
a recognition of the intertwining of the theological and psychological 
meanings of the word. On the theological level, Cynthia’s moment 
of grace or redemption is a strictly Augustinian one: her grace comes 
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unbidden and unwilled, as a pure gift from God. Etienne Gilson 
insists that grace must not be based on merit: it is given even when the 
receiver’s actions are manifestly evil. Gilson cites Saint Paul and Saint 
Augustine as examples (161). On the other hand, Cynthia is psycho-
logically and emotionally prepared to receive grace. First, she has been 
deeply shocked by the accident involving Percy, in which she is an 
accomplice: “She could not get the little boy’s face out of her mind, and 
she staggered forward in a daze” (400). Second, she has been morally 
prepared by her recent dream in which Sydney whispered to her, “Take 
care of your little girl. She is more important than Leo’s money” (376). 
After her moment of grace, she becomes a better mother to her daugh-
ter, Theresa May. Gilson notes that while grace cannot be prepared for 
or won, it is defined by its impact or consequence: if a true moment of 
grace has occurred, a change of heart and of behaviour will follow, for 
“those who have grace want to do good and succeed in doing it” (160). 
The text thus registers a degree of self-ref lection about the different 
levels of meaning attached to the word grace: it shows an understanding 
of what Quilligan calls “the problematical process of meaning multiple 
things simultaneously with one word” (24). 
Further deliberate ironies attach to the mediations of words and 
images in human communications involving matters of the spirit, and 
here, there is an additional thematic parallel to Flannery O’Connor’s 
story “Parker’s Back.” The words on the pages of Mercy convey clearly 
an awareness of the interrelation between subjective perceptions or 
spiritual experiences and the words and images that humans attach 
to them. When Cynthia appears at the civic centre and finds herself 
standing face to face with Vicka, the child visionary whispers to her in 
Yugoslavian; thus, Cynthia has no understanding of the literal meaning 
of her words, yet she feels in her soul that a particular sentence has been 
uttered: “Holy Mother has asked you, her daughter, here today, and 
now wishes you to change your life” (402). In the text’s commentary on 
distracting images, Cynthia wonders that Vicka is able to recognize her 
as female, addressing her as “daughter,” for she has disguised herself as a 
man, donning Leo’s clothes in order to escape the town with his money. 
Despite these linguistic and imagistic distractions, one soul has spoken 
clearly to the other. By contrast, misunderstanding among true seekers 
prevails in O’Connor’s tragicomic ending. After Parker’s moment of 
grace, he bears on his back “the haloed head of a f lat stern Byzantine 
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Christ with all-demanding eyes” (667) in the hope that his wife will be 
forced to accept his tattoos; yet his wife still throws him out for his idol-
atry. The two true seekers after spiritual truth are confused by crossed 
purposes. First, Parker has spent his life in denial of spiritual questing. 
Then, when he receives grace, he knows that his life has changed pro-
foundly but cannot find words to declare the change to his wife; instead, 
he pursues his old idolatrous ways. Parker finds false comfort in graven 
images, she in strict literal interpretation of the Bible’s written words 
(675): the result is tragic distraction and isolation. 
The term mercy is another word mediating the novel’s moral and 
spiritual meanings. Two allusions to literary uses of this word are widely 
known (as is the Augustinian meaning of the word grace) in western 
cultural heritage. First, even readers who are not intimately acquainted 
with Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice may be aware of the four 
lines of Portia’s opening speech in the trial scene:
The quality of mercy is not strained,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven,
Upon the place beneath; it is twice blessed;
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes. (4.2.180-83)
This passage emphasizes the heavenly, non-societal source of mercy, the 
metaphor of rain identifying mercy with natural events, yet the passage 
also recognizes that mercy is partly a matter of human will: it comes 
from a human giver. The quotation also directs the reader’s attention 
toward certain painful truths about the central characters of the novel. 
While Sydney’s brand of mercy blesses him, it also prevents him from 
surviving in his social circumstances. The blessing Sydney confers on 
Connie Devlin produces nothing but a few feeble expressions of grati-
tude, uttered while the feckless Connie goes about destroying Sydney 
with his very weakness. Second, the allusion to Yeats’s poem “Among 
School Children” in the text’s title evokes a famous meditation on the 
individual and society. Yeats’s question, “How can we know the dancer 
from the dance?” (217), is the central question of Mercy. The text asks 
whether Sydney is able to take his inspiration directly from heaven, 
despite the wounds dealt him by the earthly church, or whether his 
character and spiritual outlook have been shaped and misshapen by his 
treatment at the hands of others in his particular social and historical 
circumstances. In its relentless deconstruction of dichotomies, the text 
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lays bare both processes. As Yeats found, the dancer has agency but 
moves according to social choreography: one cannot ever “know” the 
dancer and the dance as separate. 
This brings us to another problematized word in the novel, pact. At 
twelve, Sydney is shovelling snow from the fifty-foot-high roof of the 
church with Connie Devlin; when Connie steals his molasses sandwich, 
Sydney gives him a shove, and Connie lands in the snow below, as if 
dead. At that moment, Lyle tells us, his father made a “pact” with God, 
vowing that “if the boy lived he would never raise his hand or his voice 
to another soul and he would attend church every day” (23-24). Yet, 
the moment that makes Sydney an embodiment of Christian mercy 
has some attendant ironies. For one, after Sydney made what Lyle calls 
“this horrible pact,” Connie “stood up, wiped his face, laughed at him, 
and walked away” (24). When his father tells him of this pact years 
later, Lyle expresses his doubts: “Dad, you never touched the boy — 
so therefore God tricked you into this masochistic devotion. God has 
made you His slave because of your unnatural self-condemnation” (24). 
The text is careful to make the point, through the narrative filter of the 
non-believer, Lyle, that Sydney may have been deceived by the devil’s 
representative, Connie, or by God. Lyle also suggests that Sydney’s self-
sacrifice may be rooted in masochism. Further, in the light of the text’s 
use of a rigid Augustinian doctrine concerning the definition of grace, 
Lyle’s statement implies that it may be blasphemous for a human to 
initiate a unilateral pact with God. 
In turning to explore the text’s ironies about the nature of Sydney’s 
lifelong devotion to mercy and passive resistance, we find that meaning 
oscillates between the allegorical or conceptual level of the narrative 
and the level of social and psychological realism. Here the text throws 
much complicating evidence in the reader’s way, so that settling simply 
on the allegorical level of meaning is all but impossible. Paul de Man 
writes that the reader of allegory is inclined to focus on the text’s logical 
code, or grammar, but is compelled to pay equal attention to the details 
that erode or contradict the meaning system (Allegories 268-69). Brian 
McHale states that this oscillation between the grammar and the fig-
ures, or the conceptual and literal levels of the allegory, is ontological. 
The allegorical narrative displays more prominently than other forms 
the innate inability of narrative to create a single ontological ground-
ing for meaning (142). To begin with, Lyle states that “from the time 
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his own father died” Sydney believed that “whatever pact you make 
with God, God will honour” (24). While trying to avert a strike of Leo 
McVicer’s men, Roy Henderson is mistakenly identified as a drunken 
strike leader who had destroyed valuable machinery and spilled bar-
rels of herbicide and pesticide, necessitating a costly clean-up (16). Roy 
is photographed for a local newspaper as a drunken arsonist, and the 
fire becomes known as the “Henderson horror,” bringing shame on the 
Henderson family for thirty years. Roy’s pact that he would not eat 
until Leo came to see him in prison brings nothing but his own death: 
it is a counterproductive display of hubris, and, as such, a poor model 
to his son for making pacts with God. Pitiably, Sydney has no choice 
but to honour this one episode in which Roy’s behaviour displayed some 
semblance of noble conviction.
On the psychological level, the text provides much evidence that 
Sydney’s embodiment of New Testament mercy is rooted in self-con-
demnation and masochism, as Lyle maintains. As a boy, Sydney is beat-
en by Roy whenever he tries to protect his mother from Roy’s drunken 
assaults. At twelve, he is shot in the stomach by Roy, bringing on a 
lifelong appendix irritation that eventually causes his death. Moreover, 
Sydney’s repeated physical abuse at the hands of his biological father 
(Roy) and sexual abuse at the hands of his spiritual father (Father Porier) 
delivers the overwhelming emotional message that he is deserving of 
abuse. Unable to articulate this repressed message, Sydney transforms 
his early role of taking beatings into his adult behaviour pattern of 
harming himself in order to avoid harming others. Sydney’s efforts to 
live by an idealistic code of universal kindness may be read as an adult 
wish to return to a state of blissful infantilism, before the troubles of his 
childhood began. This may also be said of allegory as a literary form: 
Fletcher points out that allegory mediates between the id’s nostalgia for 
infancy and the superego’s wish to conform to social values (149). 
On the level of social realism, alcoholism marks the Miramichi area 
as profoundly as domestic violence and fathers leaving the area to find 
work. In his contribution to Addiction: Notes from the Belly of the Beast, 
Richards writes honestly of the alcohol abuse in his family during his 
childhood years and of his own long struggle with alcoholism: “When 
I was little, drink surrounded me as rivers did fish” (108-09). In his 
teen years, he and his friends all drank heavily “because we came from 
a hard-drinking river” (111). At fifteen, Sydney is both a reader and a 
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drunk, drinking to avoid what Dr. Johnson called “the pain of being a 
man” (20). Between fifteen and eighteen, he disappears for three years 
in order to avoid the “help” of the social workers who would put him 
in a foster home (20). When he returns, he has given up alcohol for 
literature. Years later, he admits to his children, Lyle and Autumn, that 
his reading had been an escape from his suffering: “He then told us that 
in order to run away from his life, he had read” (116). The text here 
carefully plants the irony that Sydney’s reading is a second obsession, 
on a par with alcohol as a means of killing the pain of being engaged 
in the social world.
Let us turn, then, to examine the polyvalent ironies surrounding 
Sydney’s role as the reader-hero. In his early life, Sydney the autodidact 
states that he finds his ideal of universal kindness in his reading. At 
nineteen, when he is wooing his future wife, Elly, he tells her that “those 
who scorn you taunt only themselves” (38). He tells Elly that reading 
“reminds” the reader of certain universal truths that he or she already 
knows, and that it invokes an innate moral sense of certain inalienable 
rights. Reading is his means of reminding himself of natural or univer-
sal truths that exist beyond social truth. He believes that the world is 
divided into two groups of people: one believes that “the world must 
change” and the other that “in man’s heart is the only truth that mat-
ters” (39). Identifying with the latter group, he declares that the truths 
revealed in his reading have nothing to do with social change; rather, 
they pertain only to his personal morality and knowledge.
In this regard, Elly provides a significant character foil for Sydney. 
As an orphan who was abandoned by her family, she is already, like 
Sydney, one of the injured or wounded: she fears “that anyone had 
power to do what they wanted with her life” (25). Thus, she turns from 
society toward nature, where she reads miracles (25). When she is two 
months pregnant with her first child, she takes a walk in the woods, 
meditating on the fundamental truth she shares with her husband: that 
no one has “authority over her enjoyment of the world” (85). Yet as 
time goes on, Elly finds her precious enjoyment of nature, apparently 
gifted from God, taken from her by the all-too-fallible authority of 
Leo McVicer, who has spilled herbicides in the region. Elly has numer-
ous miscarriages as a result of this poisoning of nature; her daughter, 
Autumn, is born an albino, and eventually Elly dies due to chemical 
poisoning, as do numerous other members of the community over three 
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generations. Once again, Richards implies that no truths exist beyond 
temporality, history, and the politically engaged writing of the human 
drama in texts like the novel.
While Sydney withdraws from championing his truths in the social 
sphere, the text provides two important character foils that attest to the 
importance of doing so. When Sydney is wrongly suspected of the sex-
ual abuse and murder of Trenton Pit, he refuses either to defend himself 
or to hire a lawyer, but Elly engages the lawyer Isabel Young, who speaks 
well for him at the inquest. Elly empathizes with the suffering Isabel 
undergoes for Sydney’s sake, and tells him that “She is a hero — not 
you, Sydney — she is.” (154). This one moment in which the meek but 
wise woman dares to confront her husband suggests ironically that she, 
the non-reader, perceives the fallacy in Sydney’s view that the truths 
of his reading pertain only to the private sphere of the heart. It could 
be said, nonetheless, that the narrative finally confirms Sydney’s Stoic 
and pacifist position that “the truth will out” because after his death, 
his reputation is rehabilitated: “The men who had one time tormented 
him because he was different now held a place for him in their hearts” 
(347). Constable John Delano seems to support this view: “All of a sud-
den falsehood just goes away” (335). Yet the constable’s actions inform 
against his words, for Delano has re-opened the case of the bridge sabo-
tage, leading to the clearing of Sydney’s name, and he has gathered the 
evidence to prosecute Connie Devlin for his part in Sydney’s death. Like 
Isabel Young, Delano stands up for Sydney when he will not; together, 
they voice the textual irony that the omnipotence of no truth can be 
assumed, that all truths must be represented and debated in a dialectic 
social process.
Sydney’s interaction with the one academic in the novel demon-
strates both the narrow-minded middle-class prejudice of Professor 
David Scone and the futility of Sydney’s social disengagement. Scone 
is conveniently silent when a contemporary novel exploring alternative 
sexual mores is stolen by Mat Pit from Sydney’s bookshelf and used at 
the inquest as evidence that Sydney has molested and killed Trenton 
Pit. Scone, and other professors who have praised and taught this novel 
as a contemporary classic, do not come forward to attest to its greatness 
as literature and therefore to its having a valid place on the shelf of any 
serious student of literature (153). Also, when Sydney, at eighteen, comes 
to Scone inquiring about university study, Scone misreads Sydney, see-
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ing in him only the stereotype of a common labourer who would be 
incapable of intellectual pursuits. Outraged, Sydney goes home and 
writes a letter of protest, but then his pact with God intervenes: he is 
convinced that he has committed a “crime” by having “set out in a let-
ter to injure someone else,” and he burns the letter in shame (22). The 
text points out that the educated person should be motivated by virtue, 
but also that virtue must speak for itself or it will be repeatedly stepped 
on. When Sydney silences himself, he again takes a beating, as he did 
in his childhood.
Devoted to a universal love of mankind, Sydney keeps his pact of 
doing no harm to others. Repeatedly, he refuses to defend himself or his 
family against physical and verbal attacks from members of the com-
munity. Since he is physically big and strong, courageous, and articu-
late, his refusal to defend his family conveys the message to his children 
that they are not worth defending. In other words, his aggression is 
passive, and it takes the form of neglect, whereas his father’s aggression 
was active and took the form of abuse; nonetheless, Sydney’s neglect 
causes the same damage to his children’s self-esteem as his father’s abuse 
did to Sydney. He also makes a significant error in judgment that can 
only injure his family members further, inflicting upon them a sense 
of abandonment. In order to pay back taxes, he leaves his family for 
three years to work in a northern camp; once again, he chooses to act 
on universal principle: a man pays his debts. In doing so, he neglects 
personal loyalties and the possibility that some compromise could be 
worked out between principle and personal love. When he leaves, his 
family sorely needs him: Autumn is being molested by local boys (210); 
Lyle has recently punched a teacher (225); Elly’s health is still in ques-
tion; and Percy is just three years old. During the three years of Sydney’s 
absence, Lyle becomes a drunk and a thief, inflicting slashes on his arms 
and chest as an emblem of his emotional and spiritual torment. At the 
end of the three years, Percy, Elly, and Sydney have died, and Lyle has 
become an agonized and lonely wanderer who “can’t forgive himself” 
(403). The text does not indicate that he blames himself specifically for 
the death of Percy; rather, it suggests that his self-condemnation is more 
generalized. Sydney’s social disengagement is thus an action in itself, 
and one that has devastating consequences for him and those he loves. 
What is true for Sydney is also true for the text itself. Just as Sydney’s 
passive resistance and silence constitute a political stance, so the literary 
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text is always part of an ongoing political discourse. Jacques Derrida 
calls this “the political stake and structure of the text, the political 
allegory of the literary text” (142). Sydney attempts to place his truth 
above those of others by refusing to debate it; inadvertently, he allows 
his pact of universal kindness to impair his attachment to individuals. 
Ironically, his gradual withdrawal from those closest to him becomes 
the way in which his principles are known in the world. Mercy thus 
makes the points through its protagonist that identity is always mobile 
and multiple because manifested in action, and that narrative meaning 
is always unresolved. Josipovici explains the nature of allegorical mean-
ing with reference to Giotto’s figures representing charity and envy: 
“Giotto’s figures always step partially out of their frames: we are shown 
Charity in action, not someone who has a charitable disposition; Envy 
in action, not someone who has an envious disposition” (182). Character 
and narrative are f luid in their meanings rather than fixed, as in the 
conventional interpretation of allegory. Tony Tremblay acknowledges 
this unresolved non-fixed nature of meaning in Richards’s fiction: “his 
world is organic and infused with spirit; three-dimensional, it is a realm 
of ideas and personalities in action” (12).
The allegory of Mercy warns against rigidity in conceptualizing 
Sydney’s character. To regard him as the reader-hero who has direct 
unmediated knowledge of the truth or the ideal is to make him an idol: 
the text warns against such idolatry. It also warns against seeing him 
simply as a fool or an icon that must be smashed by an iconoclastic 
interpretation. At the very least, we should read him in two ways simul-
taneously. In Creelman’s terms, Mercy reveals its protagonist to embody 
not individualist liberalism (149) but the individual both embroiled in 
and transcending social circumstances. One plea for such a nuanced 
reading is expressed by Sydney himself, when he admits to Elly that he 
is “not very good at the world” (137). He admits that he retreats from 
the world because it does not operate according to his principle that 
those who harm others harm only themselves. Very close to the end of 
his life, he has a quite different conception of the value of reading than 
he had at nineteen, when he declared to Elly that his reading proved 
this principle (38). At the end of a life lived by his ideal of universal 
kindness, a Québécois fellow labourer asks him, “What should I get 
from books?” Sydney replies simply, “that you are not alone, even along 
this broken tractor road. You need to know nothing else” (348). At 
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this point, he conceives of literature as offering identification with the 
suffering of others; no longer is literature an affirmation of his embodi-
ment of mercy, at whatever cost to himself and those he loves. Rather, 
literature is now a window onto the views and emotions of others, a 
means of bringing people into closer understanding with each other. In 
his answer, Sydney perhaps admits that his pact had brought suffering 
to himself and others; nonetheless, he remains true to his pact, allowing 
his kindness to Connie cause his death.
Lyle’s narrative offers a complicating gloss on his father’s life. 
Through Lyle, the text again advises readers against one-dimensional 
interpretation. On one hand, Lyle, too, is an avid reader, and all of his 
allusions support his father’s vision and courage. Lyle laments that his 
father did not know that “he and not Thoreau, was the real article, 
or that his civil disobedience went to the very soul of man” (45). He 
describes his father as Job-like and as knowing the Book of Job to be 
“the greatest and truest book in the world” for its celebration of great 
faith in a world of suffering (350). He praises Sydney for living by the 
Stoic imperative that a man must be true to his principles regardless of 
earthly reward or punishment, a truth that Sydney discovered in his 
reading of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (138, 274). Lyle also refers 
to Albert Camus’s essay “The Myth of Sisyphus,” in order to express 
his respect for his father’s heroic suffering in a world that often seems 
absurd to him (120). The cumulative effect of these allusions and many 
others is to align Sydney with some of the great icons of individualism 
in the western cultural tradition. 
On the other hand, what Lyle endorses in theory, or on the level of 
reading and literary analysis, he finds repugnant in practice, or on the 
level of lived life. Lyle believes that his father should have defended his 
family against attacks and avenged wrongs done against them; Lyle 
himself tries to do the latter in his failed attempts to kill Connie Devlin 
and Mat Pit. Lyle also blames his father for leaving the family to work 
in the north. When Sydney is about to leave, he justifies his departure 
to Lyle by referring to his past: “if you saw what I saw in my childhood, 
you would know why I do and say as I do” (223). This unexplained 
statement likely means that he was so often abused as a child that he 
vowed never to hurt anyone; yet, as Lyle tells us, he believed at the time 
that Sydney was “using his childhood to shirk his responsibility to our 
childhood” (223). Lyle spurns and curses his father, seeking revenge in 
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petty and futile ways against the institutions that wronged his father 
(stealing a chalice from the church, for example); he turns against his 
father’s nonviolence when he becomes a tough guy like Pat Pit, acquiring 
Mat’s “cold self-mesmerizing eyes of disillusioned pain” (317). Then, he 
discovers that Mat’s “self-infatuated pain” is “an opiate that all clung 
to” (150), yet he still torments himself. Although Lyle becomes wealthy 
through an unexpected inheritance from Leo McVicer (it turns out that 
Elly, Isabel Young, and Diedre Whyne are his illegitimate daughters) 
and a government compensation package for his mother’s death as a 
result of the herbicide pollution, the money brings no joy or sense of 
purpose. Lyle travels and returns home to consider suicide; he tells his 
ten-hour story to Terrieux, dressed in jacket and slacks, looking like a 
bouncer. Children see him with knife marks across his arms and chest. 
He lives like a hermit and is seen only far upriver; he packs up the 
family’s vertical shoebox of a house and is gone (417). He cannot bring 
himself to read Autumn’s novel, the vehicle by which she has exorcized 
the demons of her own past. His anger at himself leaves him stewing in 
the same “self-condemnation” and “masochism” that he said were the 
motivations behind his father’s pact of nonviolence.
The different positions assumed by Lyle make it difficult to read his 
narration and his character foil for his father in any reductive way. His 
torment may be understood as evidence of the terrible consequences of 
Sydney’s solipsism; from Roy to Sydney to Lyle, one can identify three 
generations of the fathers’ anger at the world visited upon the sons in 
the forms of abuse and neglect, culminating in Lyle’s self-hatred. Lyle’s 
anger and violence may also be read as leading, ironically, to the same 
personal isolation as his father’s passive aggression. Lyle’s tragic direction 
in life can hardly be called a convincing counterargument to the propos-
itions involved in Sydney’s world view; rather, both lives are flawed, just 
as both are, to some extent, socially predetermined. At the same time, 
Lyle’s narrative may be read as a painful tribute to his father, conveying 
the allegorical lesson that, even when exposed for all its self-centredness 
and self-delusion, such nobility in suffering as Sydney’s deserves respect 
as a sincere and courageous reaching for human greatness, guided by the 
insights of some great texts in the western literary tradition. Yet Lyle’s 
narration also emphasizes the irony that, when transferred to life in 
Sydney’s rigid uncompromising way, these literary truths are not only 
ineffective but also self-destructive. Lyle’s story of his father’s embodi-
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ment of mercy raises questions about the cultural and religious tradition 
that serves as the broad intellectual context for that project. 
The prologue and afterword, written in the voice of an omniscient 
narrator, explain that Lyle chooses Terrieux as his listener for two rea-
sons. The now middle-aged man has lost his profession as a policeman 
because he was deemed overzealous in the arrest of Mat Pit; in fact, he 
saved the young man’s life (5). Lyle wants to let Terrieux know that he 
has fallen under Mat’s spell and escaped it, and that he respects Terrieux 
for saving Mat’s life (413). He wants to let Terrieux know also, through 
various parts of his story, that he understands how institutions can mete 
out justice “as if justice was truth” (129). He has become aware, through 
witnessing his parents’ encounters with the f lawed representatives of 
various institutions, that, like individuals, social institutions are fal-
lible — they do make honest mistakes — and that they do not always 
inquire honestly and disinterestedly into truth in a factual and moral 
sense; indeed, the judgmental Lyle scorns his parents for their “rustic 
propriety” or naive trust in the law and its bogus truth claims (129). For 
his part, Terrieux finds that the storyteller exhibits a “tenderness” that 
is “a commodity of valiant people” (415). The comment suggests that 
Lyle possesses his father’s courage and perhaps also his father’s drive to 
discover spiritual truth. 
Lyle’s lonely and desperate non-quest may be illuminated by another 
relevant comparison to O’Connor’s fiction. The self-inf licted knife 
slashes across Lyle’s arms and chest are similar to the barbed wire 
wrapped around the chest of Hazel Mote, the self-torturing hero of 
Flannery O’Connor’s Wise Blood. Mote is a paradoxical anti-priest who 
preaches his denial of Christ and redemption from the hood of his car, 
but whose father was a preacher and whose blood is said to know what 
his mind does not. Lyle, too, denies the spirit, but it seems that his 
attacks on his father’s Christianity and his restless wanderings and self-
lacerations are part of a spiritual quest that has chosen him, in spite of 
himself. O’Connor describes Wise Blood as a comic novel about a man 
whose integrity lies in what he was not able to do; that is, Hazel Motes 
is unable to rid himself of Christ, the ragged figure who moves from 
tree to tree in the back of his mind. O’Connor suggests that freedom is 
a mystery and that a novel “can only be asked to deepen” that mystery 
(1). As O’Connor’s novel points out, there is a fine line between heresy 
and redemption; as with Hazel Mote, it may be that Lyle occupies both 
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sides of that line simultaneously. O’Connor also makes a comment that 
affirms the same multiplicity of intention that is found in Lyle, Sydney, 
and many of Richards’s key characters: she notes that “free will does not 
mean one will, but many wills conflicting in one man” (1). 
Each of the above interpretations of Lyle’s character is valuable, but 
if any is taken as what Maureen Quilligan calls a “unifying coherent 
truth” (241), it proves inadequate, partial, and therefore false. The nar-
rative frame of Mercy, like other parts of the text, expresses Paul de 
Man’s point that allegory lays bare the inability of narrative to convey 
fixed totalizing meanings about what is true and what is good: “the 
imperatives of truth and falsehood oppose the narrative syntax and 
manifest themselves at its expense” (Allegories 206). 
Lyle tells his story to Terrieux in order to explain “what happens in 
life” (6). Whether Lyle attaches a particular or general meaning to this 
phrase is not stated. It is clear, however, that the text’s presentation of 
allegorical meaning is certainly “subtle and encompassing.” As the early 
reviewers of Mercy recognized, the novel seems lifeless and contrived 
when read as a closed-sign system or grammar distinguished by a series 
of one-to-one equivalencies between the literal and conceptual levels of 
the narrative, the grammar and the figure; in this mistaken attempt to 
find the correct reading and to jettison incorrect readings, the meaning 
of the novel becomes stultifying and two-dimensional. By contrast, if 
interpretation is able to unpack the text’s multiple meanings, then Mercy 
becomes an allegory according to Spivak’s definition of “the allegoric 
tendency” (327) as a confession of literature’s multivalent nature.
Critics and theorists have defined the journey that our understand-
ing of allegory has taken over the last three centuries. Until the end 
of the eighteenth century, Spivak explains, “the typology of fabulistic 
characters was available to the reader outside the context of the fable 
itself ” (337). This typology was spelled out for the reader in works of 
visual art, accompanied by commentaries. These works go back as far 
as the Italian artist Giotto (1267-1337) and come forward in time until 
well into the eighteenth century in the form of Cesare Ripa’s Iconoglia 
or Moral Emblems, which was reprinted in the German Hertel edition 
in 1758-60. The book gives a list of concepts, such as “Taste,” “Justice,” 
“Incredulity,” and so on, in alphabetical order; it provides an allegorical 
image that embodies each concept and a verbal description of the image 
with an explanation of how it is drawn from classical literature and 
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the Bible. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the reader needed 
only a receptive imagination to use these sources to grasp the concep-
tual meaning implied in the literal level of the literary allegory’s double 
structure. 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a debate over allegory 
developed. The Romantics discredited the far too explicit mediation of 
allegory between the literal and conceptual or the factual and the ana-
lytical. Goethe, Blake, Coleridge, and Yeats preferred a mystical model 
of the mind, as conveyed in the aesthetic of the symbol, which erased 
the borders between these kinds of meaning. In 1969, de Man argued 
that the Romantic symbol involves an impossible identification between 
reader and text, reader and world (207). In 1979, in his interpretation 
of Rousseau’s Julie, de Man posits that allegory reminds us that liter-
ary meaning is always temporal and indeterminate. Literary meaning 
can never be detached from the material level of the narrative and its 
roots in time and place. Similarly, it can never be deracinated from the 
particular nuances of the text. The task of the critic is therefore not to 
recover what Jonathan Culler calls “some meaning which lies behind the 
work”; rather, it is, as Culler puts it, “to participate in and observe the 
play of possible meanings to which the text gives access” (247). 
In the twenty-first century, most scholars, critics, academics, jour-
nalists, teachers, and intellectuals remain unaware of this debate and 
of de Man’s revaluation of allegory and its implications. Spivak notes 
that “pedagogy still undertakes the nineteenth century dismissal of 
allegory” (327); thus, allegory remains a stumbling block for several 
reasons, attached to misunderstandings caused by the use of an out-
moded definition. As Fletcher notes, “allegories raise questions of 
meaning directly, by asserting certain propositions as good and others 
as bad” (306). Traditional allegory is understood to be about truth and 
specifically about moral truth. This primacy of the moral message in 
allegory means that some readers approve or disapprove of the work 
solely on the ground of the reader’s agreement or disagreement with its 
moral propositions. Leeming and Drowne call this disease of reading 
“allegoresis” (14). Such is the intensity of the debate over values invoked 
when an allegorical text is under consideration. This debate over values 
is understood to take place regardless of the aesthetic qualities of the 
text. Traditional allegory is assumed to place moral assertion before all 
aesthetic requirements and thus to be somewhat lacking on the aesthetic 
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level. Thus, in examining allegories, it is expected that there will be 
little to say about the aesthetic qualities of the text and that analysis 
and evaluation will focus on the moral content. Finally, critics resent 
didacticism, the province of allegory as traditionally defined, because 
it forecloses interpretation. Fletcher comments that “allegorical works 
present an aesthetic surface which implies an authoritative, thematic, 
‘correct’ reading, and which attempts to eliminate other possible read-
ings” (305). Northrop Frye finds that the critic often resents the author’s 
use of this literary form because “allegory prescribes the direction of his 
commentary, and so restricts his freedom” (90). 
If allegory has been redefined in a way that also redefines criticism, 
then it should be no surprise that Mercy is not the kind of text that 
readers of Richards might have wanted or expected or thought it to be. 
The novel invites the attention of Culler’s “interpretive critic,” who has 
the patience to “observe the play of possible meanings” rather than to 
seek the fixed sign system behind the text. Tony Tremblay notes that 
since Richards’s fiction is unique, it requires a new way of reading (11); 
this article hopes to elucidate that unique quality and to represent that 
new way. This way of reading recognizes Richards’s intelligence through 
acknowledging the apotheosis of irony in Mercy; it recognizes that the 
text’s ironical meanings cannot be detached from its regional and his-
torical realities or from the words of the narrative itself. 
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